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Abstract
Many municipalities are making critical errors in their attempts to alleviate current financial burdens by contracting with
private entities to perform many of their essential functions, most
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notably those agreements with companies to install traffic cameras
and, in many cases, to monitor and cite offenders. By subcontracting part of their exclusive power to enforce law, these municipalities essentially bargain away sovereignty by parting with portions
of their inherent police power.
As these cameras fill a role played by the state’s law enforcement personnel, municipalities impermissibly infringe on the
actual sovereignty of the state as well as the conceptual sovereignty of the people. Because sovereignty is envisioned as residing
with a people at large but is practically exercised by the state, these contracts may represent a new model of sovereignty. This model does not follow the traditional view of sovereignty as a binary or
a tension between the state and the people. Rather than returning
sovereignty to the conceptual rulers, these contracts represent a
new delegation of sovereign powers to private entities.
I. INTRODUCTION
“You know, I’m not a big government guy. But
government should be in charge of the custody, care
and control of inmates. That’s government’s responsibility.”
–

State Senator Steve Oelrich (R – Florida)1

During its 2011 session, the Tennessee General Assembly
took up a measure designed to place significant restrictions on the
growing use of traffic cameras by municipalities across the state.2
The General Assembly amended the state motor vehicle code to
make the prosecution of traffic violations documented by cameras
significantly more difficult, if not impossible.3 For example, the
new laws invalidated all citations for improper right turns on a red
signal when the only evidence of the infraction was a photograph

1. Steve Bousquet, Prison Privatization Dies in Senate 21-19, TAMPA
BAY TIMES (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/
crime/prison-privatization-dies-in-senate-21-19/1215438.
2. Act of July 1, 2011, ch. 425, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts (codified at TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 55-8-101, -110, -198 (2012)).
3. Id.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228385

2012

At the Intersection of Sovereignty and Contract

381

taken by a traffic camera.4 While municipalities that installed traffic cameras would certainly seem to be the aggrieved parties to
such a law, private entities have instead challenged the new laws.
A number of Tennessee municipalities contracted with private
companies to install, enforce, and collect fines for red light violations; these contracts gave these entities standing to contest the
law.5 On November 14, 2011, Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.
(“Redflex”) brought one such suit, nominally against the town of
Farragut, Tennessee, and petitioned the court to rule their contract
exempt from the new law or alternatively, to hold the act as a violation of the state’s constitutional ban on retrospective laws and
laws that impair contracts.6
A few months before Redflex filed suit, on May 6, 2011,
fellow traffic camera company American Traffic Solutions, Inc.
(ATS), finalized an agreement with the city of Bellingham, Washington to install cameras at six different locations across the city.7
Anticipating the arrangement, four separate citizens’ committees
began a ballot initiative in January of 2011 that sought to amend
the city code to prohibit the cameras.8 The initiative garnered the
requisite number of signatures to appear on the ballot, and on July
7, 2011, roughly one month after the contract was finalized, the
Bellingham City Council voted unanimously to take no action to
stop the measure.9 While the city council essentially demurred to
the initiative, ATS turned to the courts to protect its contractual
arrangement, lest the voters approve the initiative. Whereas
Redflex asked the court to clarify or even strike down a state law,
ATS took one step further and petitioned the court to hold a citizen’s ballot initiative unenforceable.10

4. Id.
5. See Complaint at 4, Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc. v. Farragut, Tenn., No.
181694-1 (Ch. Knox Cnty., Tenn. 2011) [hereinafter Redflex Complaint].
6. Redflex Complaint, supra note 5, at 12 (citing TENN. CONST. art. I,
§ 20).
7. Complaint, Am. Traffic Solutions, Inc. v. Bellingham, No. 11-201991-4 (Super. Ct. Whatcom Cnty., Wash. 2011) [hereinafter Am. Traffic Solutions Complaint].
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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The foregoing are only two examples of a continuing nationwide conversation over the place of private corporations and
camera technology in the largely public arena of traffic monitoring,
enforcement, ticketing, and collections. Certainly, there are many
good arguments for using traffic cameras. Studies have estimated
that traffic intersections witness over 100,000 crashes and over
1,000 deaths per year.11 Installing automated traffic cameras is not
an unreasonable measure to reduce these rates. In addition to safety concerns, traffic cameras also generate revenue for states and
municipalities and free up law enforcement resources.
Conversely, the use of the same cameras triggers a number
of negative responses. These cameras shift the burden of proof to
the violator to disprove the offense, as a photograph acts as prima
facie evidence, replacing the duty of law enforcement to appear
and give in-court testimony before an accused offender is obligated
to even present a defense. They can also give the impression that
the municipality is more interested in making money than punishing traffic offenses. Indeed, many local officials have made statements that fuel such speculation. For example, the city of Tampa
recently began to fret when its picturesque Bayshore Boulevard
was criticized as too rough and unsightly for the incoming delegates attending the 2012 Republican National Convention.12 To
solve the issue, a Tampa city council member suggested that the
city “us[e] fines from Tampa’s new red-light cameras, which are
currently on a pace to generate almost triple the originally projected revenue, to pay for improvements.”13 The state of Texas was
more explicit in the fundraising nature of its red light camera program. Texas state law allows municipalities to contract with private companies to install and enforce red light violations.14 While
the law prohibited municipalities from splitting the collected fines
with the red light camera operator, the law mandated that half of
11. Summary
Report,
U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
TRANSP.,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/research/safety/05049/ (last visited Nov.
21, 2012).
12. Richard Danielson, Tampa’s Bayshore Boulevard Criticized as Too
Shabby for Republican National Convention, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 7, 2012),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/localgovernment/even-after-roadwork-tampasbayshore-boulevard-criticized-as-too-shabby-for/1209582.
13. Id.
14. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 707.003(a) (West 2011).
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the fines be sent annually to the state comptroller.15 While these
fines were meant to go to a laudable source—emergency trauma
centers across Texas—the state diverted these monies to cover an
economic shortfall and to comply with the balanced budget mandate in the state constitution.16
This Article does not seek to engage in this debate over
whether traffic camera contracts make sense as a matter of financial savings or law enforcement efficiency. Rather, this Article
argues that these contracts are unwise because they undermine
both the actual sovereignty of the state as well as the conceptual
sovereignty of the people, the basis upon which state authority
rests. This Article is structured as follows. Part II addresses the
trend toward privatization of governmental services as well as the
scholarship critical of many of these endeavors. Part III discusses
the historical evolution of the concept of sovereignty, while Part
IV examines the evolution of the doctrine of police power—a
prime method by which the state can exercise its sovereignty. Part
V argues that the efforts by many municipalities to privatize portions of their law enforcement power compromise the sovereignty
of the state, and Part VI views these contracts as also violating the
conceptual sovereignty as the people. Finally, Part VII questions
what changes may be wrought by altering the location of sovereignty in these ways.
II.

PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES

The larger idea of privatizing governmental services is
popular, even in good economic times, due to a number of largely
ideological, neo-liberal factors.17 The idea of cutting or privatizing
15. Id. §§ 707.003(b), 707.008(a).
16. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 49 (a); Beth Francesco Currie & Amy
Burgess, Texas Lawmakers Sit on Red-Light Revenue Dedicated to Trauma
Centers, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Jan. 7, 2012), http://www.dallasnews.com/
news/state/headlines/20120107-texas-lawmakers-sit-on-red-light-revenuededicated-to-trauma-centers.ece; Texas Red-light Camera Cash Not Reaching
Trauma Rooms, CALLER.COM (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.caller.com/news/2012/
jan/09/texas-red-light-camera-cash-not-reaching-trauma-ro/.
17. For a good overview of the rise of neoliberal economic policy since
the early 1980s, see generally DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF
NEOLIBERALISM (2005).
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essential functions of government becomes even more attractive
when trying to do the same with less, as the recent economic
downturn has necessitated, and traffic cameras have played a part
in the recovery plans of many municipalities. However, it is important to note that the move to utilize traffic cameras did not
begin with the 2008 recession.18 According to the Insurance Institute of Highway Safety, as of May 2012, red light cameras were in
use in roughly 552 communities, while speed cameras were operational in over 111 others.19
Though the use of traffic cameras is a somewhat recent development, these traffic camera contracts do not represent the only
time that the state has delegated its sovereign law enforcement
powers under the guise of efficiency or monetary savings. For
example, there is an extensive historiography on the privatization
of the state’s power to incarcerate criminal offenders.20 This research shows that many southern state legislatures in the late nineteenth century turned over the punishment of state prisoners to private companies, primarily through the convict leasing system.21
One of the most egregious examples of the abuses inherent in the
convict leasing system occurred in Florida. The state, concerned
with the costs of maintaining prisons, sanctioned the leasing of
prisoners to private companies.22 The state officially authorized
18. For example, a 1998 report identified roughly thirty-seven traffic
camera programs, active and discontinued test programs, in the U.S (including
cameras for red-light, speed detection, railroad crossing, and HOV/Bus Lane
violations), as well as programs in use in eleven countries or municipalities outside of the U.S. See Shawn Turner & Amy Ellen Polk, Overview of Automated
Enforcement in Transportation, 68 INST. TRANSP. ENGINEERS J., 20, 28 (1998),
available at http://www.ite.org/membersonly/itejournal/pdf/Jfa98a20.pdf.
19. Communities Using Red Light and/or Speed Cameras as of November
2012, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY: HIGHWAY LOSS DATA INST.,
http://www.iihs.org/laws/auto_enforce_cities.aspx (last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
20. See generally ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF FREE
LABOR: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH
(1996); MATTHEW J. MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER: CONVICT LEASING IN
THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1866–1928 (1996); DAVID OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN
SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE (1996);
Vivien M. L. Miller, Reinventing the Penitentiary: Punishment in Florida,
1868–1923, 1 AM. NINETEENTH CENTURY HIST. 82 (2000).
21. See sources cited supra note 20.
22. Miller, supra note 20, at 88–89.
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this practice in 1868, the same year and in the same law that the
state created its first prison.23 It was not long thereafter—and very
soon after the end of Reconstruction—that the state legislature decided to abolish the state prison entirely and lease the prisoners to
private railroad, turpentine, and, later, phosphate companies.24
The convict leasing system gradually declined in the twentieth century, when the infamous 1923 Martin Tabert case officially brought an end to the practice in Florida; the state, however, has
not lost its zeal in seeking to punish criminals in the most costeffective way possible.25 The 2012 state legislature recently debat23. Id. at 82.
24. Id. at 88; see also MANCINI, supra note 20, at 185, 188.
25. Martin Tabert was a young man from North Dakota who, in a zeal for
adventure and likely also looking for seasonal work, set out across the United
States. MANCINI, supra note 20, at 115. Unfortunately, on December 15, 1921,
after catching a westbound train out of Jacksonville, Florida, Tabert was ensnared by the Sheriff of Leon County, Florida, who had concocted a moneymaking scheme to prey on persons who hopped freight trains for free passage.
See id.; Vivien E. Miller, The Icelandic Man Cometh: North Dakota State Attorney Gudmunder Grimson and a Reassessment of the Martin Tabert Case, 81
FLA. HIST. Q. 279, 282 (2003). The scheme worked as follows: railroad employees would wire ahead the number of men entering Tallahassee so the Sheriff
could wait and arrest them. Miller, supra note 25, at 283. After the arrests, they
would be convicted of vagrancy and sentenced a fine of $25.00. Id. at 282. Not
only was this a hefty sum for persons traveling by boxcar, but, more importantly, the money had to be paid within two days of sentencing. Id. As most could
not do so, the men would then be forced to serve their alternative sentence:
ninety days at the Putnam Lumber Company Turpentine Camp, a private entity.
Jerrell H. Shofner, Postscript to the Martin Tabert Case: Peonage as Usual in
the Florida Turpentine Camps, 60 FLA. HIST. Q. 161 (1981). Putnam Lumber
paid the Sheriff $20.00 per man, which he split up with the spotters from the
railroad company. MANCINI, supra note 20, at 197. After being scooped up in
this scheme, Tabert was shipped off to the lumber camp where he was brutally
flogged to death. Id. After Tabet’s parents were cryptically notified of his death
by fever in a prison work camp in far-away Florida, public outrage and the actions of his parents, the North Dakota Attorney General, the New York World,
and the North Dakota and Florida Legislatures finally put an end to the practice
of leasing prisoners to private entities. Id. As was noted by Jerrell Shofner,
while the Florida Legislature formally ended the practice, in reality, the existence of debt peonage laws, and sometimes just the simple exercise of force and
white community pressure, allowed the practice to continue in pockets of north
Florida until after World War II, when turpentine was no longer a major industry
in the state. Shofner, supra note 25, at 172–73.
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ed a proposal to privatize twenty-seven of its prisons and work
camps in south Florida.26 What is most interesting about the proposal was not what was argued, but what was absent from argument altogether. Proponents of the bill believed that private contractors would operate the prisons more efficiently, while opponents argued that the expected savings were too speculative.27 As
one journalist described the debate, “Privatization has polarized the
Legislature into two camps: One sees outsourcing as a proven way
to cut costs; the other views it as a risky undertaking riddled with
hidden costs.”28 The debate largely did not include arguments regarding whether privatizing the state’s obligation to incarcerate
prisoners was even proper. It boiled down to an argument over
whether the promised savings would come to pass.29
Other scholars have highlighted the problems in the trend
toward privatization of governmental operations. Christopher Serkin raises the concern that these contracts will tie the hands of future public officials.30 Serkin carefully notes that local governments have long constrained the actions of their successors through
methods such as signing contracts, alienating property, or incurring
debt—what he refers to as “entrenchment.”31 Historically, however, there was largely a balance between allowing municipalities the
26. Steve Bousquet, Savings Tough to Calculate in Florida Prison Privatization Plan, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, http://www.tampabay.com/
news/publicsafety/crime/article1214245.ece.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. On February 14, 2012, the Florida Senate voted down the proposal 21-19. Bousquet, supra note 1. Florida Senator Steve Oelrich (RGainesville, District 14), a former Alachua County, Florida Sheriff, was critical
in the vote. Id. Oelrich did raise non-fiscal concerns in voting against the
measure, arguing that “You know, I’m not a big government guy. But government should be in charge of the custody, care and control of inmates. That’s
government’s responsibility.” Id.
30. Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law:
Binding Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 881–82 (2011) (“This
Article argues that entrenchment through private law and private rights is actually commonplace, that it is subject to certain structural protections that preserve
flexibility for future governments, but that recent changes—like limits on eminent domain—threaten to tip the scales of an often hidden but otherwise carefully balanced equilibrium between stability and flexibility.”).
31. Id. at 885–86.
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necessary “flexibility” to govern and the “stability” to honor its
policy commitments.32 Serkin argues that in recent years this balance has been upset as local governments found new, creative
methods to entrench their decisions and limit the options of future
decision makers.33 For example, Serkin argues that the power of
eminent domain has traditionally acted as a powerful antientrenchment tool, calling it “the ultimate de-entrenching safety
valve.”34 This power, however, has been significantly restricted by
more recent limits on its use beginning with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kelo v. City of New London.35
Julie Roin argues that the move toward privatization is not
a money-saving endeavor or an attempt at efficiency as many of its
proponents claim, but is in actuality a way to covertly borrow
money.36 For example, Roin cites the 2008 decision by the city of
Chicago to sell the right to collect monies from the city’s parking
meters for seventy-five years for a lump sum payment of $1.156
billion.37 Roin argues that by foregoing future revenue for immediate payment, Chicago surreptitiously received a loan in exchange
for future debt.38 This, Roin notes, will leave future city residents
worse off because the monies granted by the parking meter con32. Id. at 881–82.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 917 (“Eminent domain is the ultimate de-entrenching safety
valve because it creates flexibility across a wide swath of entrenching devices.”).
35. Id. at 919 (“Reforms following Kelo v. City of New London have
restricted the power of eminent domain in many states, removing one of the core
de-entrenching mechanisms from local governments’ toolkits.” (footnote omitted)). See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). Other
pre-Kelo scholars recognized that the Supreme Court, in United States Trust Co.
v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), suggested that eminent domain could be used
to overcome onerous contracts, as the power of eminent domain cannot be contracted away. See Michael L. Zigler, Takings Law and the Contract Clause: A
Takings Law Approach to Legislative Modifications of Public Contracts, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1463–64 (1984) (“The state also has the option of condemning the contract or a portion of the contract in an eminent domain proceeding, an alternative suggested in United States Trust. If the state desired to renounce the contract wholly, eminent domain would be appropriate.”).
36. Julie A. Roin, Privatization and the Sale of Tax Revenues, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 1965, 1967–68 (2011).
37. Id. at 1993–95.
38. Id. at 1997.
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tract will have long since been depleted.39 Further, with the city
unable to take in this revenue, future residents are not only required to pay to maintain the meters, but also to find new sources
of revenue to fund essential services.40
Of course, criticism of these actions is not limited to the
privatization of government services in the wake of the 2008 subprime market crash. In 1990, Janice Griffith noted the pitfalls inherent in privatization attempts by municipalities to cope with
shrinking budgets.41 Griffith explained that public contracts with
private entities are bound by a number of unique constraints, which
are mostly commonsense: the municipality is subject to a range of
laws not always applicable to private entities; the municipality
must have the legal power to execute these contracts; and the particular municipal officials must have the power to consent on behalf of the municipality.42 For Griffith, however, the fourth, and
most important constraint on public/private contracts is the rule
that the municipality shall not contract away its police power or
impermissibly bind future legislative activity—what has alternatively been referred to as the “reserved powers doctrine” or the
“inalienable power doctrine.”43 In order to remedy what Griffith
39. Id. at 1997–98.
40. Id.
41. Interestingly, Griffith opens her 1990 article with a description that
could have been written in 2012:
During the past decade federalism has undergone a dramatic
change. The nation’s physical infrastructure is aging and inadequate. The federal government, however, has made massive reductions in aid programs that in the past provided financial support to state and local governments. These cutbacks, accompanied by greater resistance to taxation at the local level, have forced municipalities to diminish spending in
many areas.
Janice C. Griffith, Local Government Contracts: Escaping from the Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IOWA L. REV. 277, 280 (1990).
42. Id. at 281.
43. Id. at 281–83, 291. Griffith notes a slight distinction between these
two terms. For example, the reserved powers doctrine is a rule of construction
where every public/private contract contains an implied reservation of the police
power, whereas the inalienable power doctrine prohibits a governmental entity
from contracting away this power. Id. at 282–83. In United States. v. Winstar
Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996), which post-dates Griffith’s article, the Supreme
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feels was an unruly array of tests to determine whether a public/private contract violates these doctrines, Griffith proposed a
five-part test that could provide more uniformity.44
Unlike these critiques, this Article does not propose a balancing test or set of guidelines to help courts or municipal officials
strike a proper balance for public/private contracts. It also does not
comment on the wisdom of traffic cameras as a method of law enforcement. Finally, this Article does not argue that municipalities
can execute contracts with impunity or without regard for honoring
their legitimate obligations that do not affect core governmental
operations.45 Rather, this Article makes a more fundamental
Court continues to refer to this doctrine as the reserved power doctrine. Id. at
874.
44. Griffith, supra note 41, at 285–86. Griffith found that courts were
generally using three tests: a “governmental/proprietary test,” which distinguished between a governmental function (which could not be delegated) and a
proprietary activity (where the government was acting similar to a private party
and which could be contracted to a third party); a “function test,” which exempted certain sovereign powers (like those inherent to the police power, the power
of eminent domain, and the power to tax); and, finally, a more nebulous test
where courts would measure the contract against larger public policy concerns.
Id. at 284–85. In response to these tests, Griffith proposed a uniform five-part
test. Id. at 285–86. According to Griffith,
[t]he standards provide that courts should uphold contracts
made by a governmental body if (1) the formation of the contract is not the result of fraud, corruption, or bad faith; (2) the
contract does not modify the legal structure under which the
governmental body is organized and operates; (3) the contract
advances a governmental interest that outweighs the loss of
governmental control; (4) the contract restrains the operation
of governmental functions no further than necessary and for
no longer than necessary to accomplish governmental objectives; and (5) circumstances have not so changed as to cause
the contract’s continued performance to result in substantial
harm to the public.
Id.
45. There is extensive jurisprudence on the topic of when public contracts
can be abridged by a later enactment. The Supreme Court, for example, in United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839 (1996) and United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), recognized that the state and federal governments
must honor their obligations when entering into contracts that are largely financial and do not implicate core governmental functions. U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S.
at 24–26; Winstar, 518 U.S. at 880.
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claim: certain governmental functions, like law enforcement, must
simply remain just that—governmental functions. Privatizing law
enforcement causes ideological ruptures in our appreciation of the
concept of sovereignty.
This is not an abstract concern. The role of ideology is of
paramount importance in sustaining the legitimacy of governmental institutions. For example, despite the popular conception of a
rule by “We the People,” in reality sovereignty resides with the
state while “the people” exercise supervisory functions, primarily
through the ballot.46 This arrangement is the product of a historical
struggle over the actual role non-state actors should play in American government: should the state exercise sovereignty subject to
oversight by the people through formal methods like voting (state
sovereignty), or should the people remain as the true sovereigns
who act through methods like voting if they choose to, but who can
also act on their own if desired (popular sovereignty)?47 As one of
the main attributes of sovereignty, the power of law enforcement
forms a critical object of this struggle. Over time, the state has
become the exclusive location of sovereignty and with it, has eventually gained a monopoly over law enforcement. Despite this evolution, as long as the state is viewed as simply exercising the sovereign powers lent them by the citizenry, the ideology of popular
sovereignty can remain intact. The problem, however, is that
many municipalities have unwittingly exposed sovereignty as residing with the state by contracting their law enforcement power to
private corporations, effectively cordoning off these powers from
46. There is a rich historiography on this tension over the role of the people in a government predicated on the concept of popular sovereignty. See generally JASON FRANK, CONSTITUENT MOMENTS: ENACTING THE PEOPLE IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (2009) (arguing that people exist as an effect of
successful claims to speak on their behalf); CHRISTIAN FRITZ, AMERICAN
SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2007) (exploring how Americans struggled to understand how a collective sovereign could play the role of the ruler and be ruled by
a government); LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (analyzing the understanding of “popular sovereignty” and “the people” by the colonists); EDMUND
MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1989) (exploring the notion of popular sovereignty
and how it remains a political force today).
47. See sources cited supra note 46.

2012

At the Intersection of Sovereignty and Contract

391

popular review. Furthermore, many of these contracts have also
given private traffic camera companies the standing to challenge
the sovereignty of the state itself. Thus, in an effort to promote
efficiency and safety and to generate revenue, many municipalities
have taken actions that threaten to challenge both the conceptual
sovereignty of the people as well as the actual sovereignty of the
state.
This is additionally problematic. In the above-described
model, sovereignty is positioned as part of a struggle between state
and non-state actors over the powers of making and enforcing law.
However, in the traffic camera scenario, the sovereign power of
law enforcement is relinquished by the state, yet it is not returned
to the people, its conceptual owners. Rather, it is vested in a select
group of individuals. In this model, sovereign powers are no longer a binary or a tension between the people and the state. Instead,
these contracts create a new model entirely, where sovereign powers of law enforcement are granted to the state, but where the state,
seeking to remedy fiscal difficulties, alienates that power through
contract by giving control to private corporations. If these corporations are considered aggregates of individuals—namely officers,
directors, employees, and shareholders—does the delegation of
these powers represent a relocation of sovereignty?
III. FORMS OF SOVEREIGNTY
The concept of sovereignty defies simple description.48 Indeed, many scholars find fault in the existing definitions of sovereignty, not to mention the failure to envision reasonable alternatives.49 Nonetheless, at a fundamental level, there must be the evo48. See JOHN HOFFMAN, SOVEREIGNTY 9–11 (1997).
49. Stephen Krasner explains that the concept of sovereignty is muddled
because the term is often used without reference to its many variations, both
internationally and domestically. Specifically, Krasner argues that there are four
ways that sovereignty has been described: “international legal sovereignty,
Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty.” STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3 (1999).
For this Article, I am envisioning domestic sovereignty, the power of an entity
or group within a particular society to possess final authority to make and enforce law. See id.; see also James R. Martel, Can There Be Politics Without
Sovereignty? Arendt, Derrida and the Question of Sovereign Inevitability, 6
LAW, CULTURE AND THE HUMAN. 153, 154 n.2 (2010).
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lution of an impersonal state, as opposed to rule by a person, family, or dynasty, which the ruler is obligated to maintain.50 In turn,
the state must be recognized as possessing absolute political authority.51 While a classical version of sovereignty was present in
ancient Greece, this society did not develop the attributes that are
consistent with its modern form.52
A. History of Sovereignty
Many scholars attribute the true genesis of the concept to
sixteenth-century political theorist Jean Bodin who first articulated
modern notions of sovereignty in the aftermath of the Protestant
Reformation and the battles between Catholics and French Huguenots that ravaged his homeland.53 Bodin formulated his ideas as an
attempt to bridge the conceptual divide between the Catholic
French monarchy, who relied upon a mixture of Roman law and
their divine right of rule, and dissident Huguenots, who argued for
a right of resistance.54 Others, most notably Michel Foucault, dated sovereignty somewhat earlier to the Middle Ages and more critically argued that it was created and used to impose—and later
resist—the power of monarchies.55 By the eighteenth century, this
same notion of sovereignty was co-opted and employed not just to
limit the monarch, but to justify alternative forms of government
such as the rise of parliamentary democracies like those following
the French Revolution.56 Similarly, James Martel places the modern notion of sovereignty as arising out of the same forces that
50. F. H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 16–17 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed.
1986) (1966); RAIA PROKHOVNIK, SOVEREIGNTY: HISTORY AND THEORY 19
(2008).
51. HINSLEY, supra note 50, at 17.
52. Id. at 16–17.
53. Id. at 71, 120–21; PROKHOVNIK, supra note 50, at 41.
54. HINSLEY, supra note 50, at 120. According to Bodin, sovereignty is
equated with absolute and perpetual power. Broadly speaking, Bodin listed the
following as the requisite attributes of sovereignty: the power to make law; the
power to make war or peace; the power to appoint high state officials; and the
power to act at the final source of appeal from all courts. JEAN BODIN, SIX
BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 25, 43–46 (M.J. Tooley trans., Oxford Univ.
Press, 1955) (1576).
55. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED: LECTURES AT THE
COLLEGE DE FRANCE 34–35 (1997).
56. Id. at 35.
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brought about the notions of modern liberalism.57 Indeed, Martel
notes that the modern liberal emphasis on the individual and free
access to markets is only obtainable through modern notions of
sovereignty.58
B. Sovereignty in the United States
By the time of the founding era of the United States, the
Constitutional framers likewise had to address the question of sovereignty. While a well-known struggle between the federal and
state governments took place, a larger question remained unanswered: was sovereignty to lie truly with the people or with the
peoples’ representatives, the state?59 As set forth in the Preamble
to the U.S. Constitution, “We the people” are the stated rulers.
Like much of the new U.S. constitutional system, however, implementation of the contours of popular sovereignty was left for
later generations.60 Indeed, the Constitution left scores of unanswered questions for succeeding generations to define. The early
republic wrestled with how far Congress could go in making laws
that were “necessary and proper” to carry out its duties (Article I,

57. Martel, supra note 49, at 154.
58. Id. at 155.
59. As was noted by James Martel, Donald Lutz has classified four different models of popular sovereignty occurring in western political thought: the
Leviathan Model (proposed by Hobbes where sovereignty only resides with the
people temporarily before it is permanently transferred to the ruler); the Traditionalistic Model (proposed by Bodin, Philippe du Plessis-Mornay, and others
where the people create the ruler); the Constitutional Republic Model (set forth
by Locke, William Penn, and others where the people create a popular government but only act through their representatives); and the Constitutional Democracy Model (described by Rousseau and Roger Williams where the people create
a popular government and retain active and direct participation in that government). DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 76 (2006);
Martel, supra note 49, at 153, 154 n.2. It appears that the tension over defining
popular sovereignty as one between the people and the state as the representatives of the people could also be described as a battle between the Constitutional
Republic Model (the state) and the Constitutional Democracy Model (the people) if we use Lutz’s categories.
60. Of course, ideas of popular sovereignty well pre-dated the American
example. See MORGAN, supra note 46, at 38–39. This Article refers to the
unique popular sovereignty begun in the United States and not the mixed constitution model present in England, for example.
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Section 8),61 what documents could be considered contracts that
could not be impaired by the state (Article I, Section 10),62 or
whether the judiciary had the power to review legislation (Article
III).63 Likewise, the idea of popular sovereignty also required
structure and definition by future generations. Unlike these questions, which were addressed through formal law adjudication and
resulted in short-hand reference markers (such as McCulloch,
Dartmouth College, Marbury), the concept of popular sovereignty
was much more difficult to define.
Following independence, the new nation espoused that it
was ruled by the sovereign people, but in reality, the two different
models of sovereignty competed for primacy. The popular sovereignty model conceptualized power as remaining with the people.64
Under the state sovereignty model, while the people are conceptually sovereign, the state ultimately exercises sovereign power; the
people delegate their sovereign power to the state. This model
envisions the people as exercising their sovereignty through formal
methods like voting, petitioning government, and, eventually, by
exercising rights in courts of law.65 For much of American history,
there existed a tension between these two sovereignty models—
state and popular.66
Christian Fritz has explained that in the United States, from
the founding era until the Civil War, the idea of the people as sovereign meant that they could conceptually operate in three different

61. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 411–25 (1819).
62. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 627–50
(1819).
63. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–78 (1803).
64. We can refine the state sovereignty argument so that our analysis is
not quite so starkly defined. Raia Prokhovnik, for example, notes that the promoters of a sovereignty where the people remained largely on the sidelines, or
what we would recognize as state-based sovereignty in the modern American
system, appreciated that the checks on sovereignty would be accomplished by
dividing sovereign power among the branches of government. PROKHOVNIK,
supra note 50, at 122. Sovereign power could conceptually remain with the
people as long as state power was diffused. Id.
65. See supra note 59.
66. Many scholars have addressed this tension in the early republic over
what form popular sovereignty would actually take. See, e.g., sources cited
supra note 46.
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capacities.67 First, the people could exercise sovereignty as the
creators of the new constitutions that set up government.68 Second,
the people could also act as “the ruler” to oversee their elected representatives, much in the same way that a king—also a sovereign—would pick his aids.69 In this capacity, the people could
express displeasure by voting.70 Finally, the people could operate
as “the ruled” who had rights guaranteed to them by constitutions.71 These rights allowed persons or groups access to politics.
Under this view, the people did not necessarily act as the sovereign
but played a more realistic role as one group or individual among
many.72 Fritz argues that in the period before the Civil War, these
three roles existed simultaneously and competed for primacy.73
Ultimately, the role of the people as the “ruled,” to use Fritz’s categories, won pre-eminence. In this capacity, the people are conceptually sovereign, but the state exercises true sovereign power.
The evolution of the modern conception of sovereignty
does not, however, necessarily represent an ominous turn of
events. Under this model where the state exercises sovereignty,
the citizenry has theoretically delegated this power to the state and,
in return, possesses rights that serve as a check on state sovereign
power. Indeed, rights are the vehicle through which the citizenry
exercises its sovereignty. Instead of considering such rights as
largely inconsequential checks granted to the people in return for
relinquishing their sovereignty to the state, rights can play an important role in the model of state sovereignty. Under this view, the
reality of sovereignty residing with the state is more defensible.
The state is perceived as a guarantor of universal liberties and
freedoms, and these rights are primarily vindicated through state
institutions like the courts. Rights in this capacity are possessed by
all, and the state ensures their existence.
Our current model of state sovereignty and its emphasis on
universal rights, which evolved post-World War II, views the judiciary as responsible for enunciating and bringing to life the grand
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

FRITZ, supra note 46, at 6.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6–8.
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principles contained in constitutional provisions.74 As noted by
Lorraine Weinrib, in the United States, this system was particularly
exemplified by the jurisprudence of the Warren Court through decisions like Brown v. Board of Education75 and Loving v. Virginia.76 In both of these cases, the Court rejected arguments that predicated a segregated system of education (Brown) or laws banning
interracial marriage (Loving) on custom, tradition, or social hierarchy.77 Arguments of this sort rely implicitly on a recognition of
community norms for their basis. In the post-World War II rights
model, however, the courts bear the responsibility of cutting
through local normative-based arguments to protect basic rights
possessed by all.
For example, in Brown, the Court was not swayed by popular arguments that schools in Clarendon County, South Carolina
had always been segregated, were segregated because it was the
will of the community, and natural (racial) difference sanctioned
this method.78 The school system in Clarendon County was segregated because the majority of the white community desired it.
Nonetheless, the judiciary in this model protected the children of
Clarendon County, acting, as Weinrib describes it,
as a safe haven from both popular sovereignty, history and tradition, on the one hand, and judicial subjectivity, on the other. In this paradigm, the abstract
ideas of equal citizenship and respect for human
dignity—ideas based on human personhood—give
structure to a legal frame that is regulative of all exercises of state authority.79
The emphasis on the rule of law and an independent judiciary to
enforce the law undergirded the human rights movement that exploded globally after World War II. Indeed, the penultimate defi74. See Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American
Exceptionalism, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 84, 84–85 (Sujit
Choudhry ed., 2006).
75. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
77. Weinrib, supra note 74, at 99–102.
78. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
79. Weinrib, supra note 74, at 88.
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ciency with the human-rights-based conception of adjudication is
the lack of enforceability where viable states and independent judiciaries do not exist; this deficiency evidences the importance of the
state to this model.
The rights-based system provides a means by which the
people can exercise their sovereignty, while ensuring the rights of
people who do not conform to social norms of the popular majority. Under this model, rights act as a more sophisticated way for
people to exercise their sovereignty. While it is tempting to take a
nostalgic view of the popular sovereignty tradition as a system of
law that was more closely rooted in popular will than law mediated
through the apparatus of an impersonal state, this system came
with a terrible price for those deemed outside prevailing social
norms. Those who conformed to different notions of work, sex, or
thought often paid dearly for their differences. Others, like N.W.
Barber, have realistically reconfigured the nature of the state by
reminding us that it is socially created.80 Accordingly, a view that
the state simply must be opposed to maintain liberties for its people fails to recognize the human agency in creating the state. 81
Finally, if, in a system of state sovereignty, the proper exercise of
popular will is defined by actions such as voting, petitioning the
government, and using the courts, these actions are legitimate because they appreciate the nuanced view that a state also exists to
protect the people from each other.
Of course, this Article conceptualizes the phenomenon of
state sovereignty broadly and recognizes that there are many examples, especially on the state and local level, where popular participation is expanded to a greater degree. For example, John
Dinan has noted that many states permitted the amendment of their
constitutions by direct citizen initiative.82 Certainly, in many states
the local electorate can directly alter the constitution; yet, this rec80. N.W. Barber, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 25 (2010).
81. See id.
82. JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
59–62 (2006). While procedures vary, this initiative power generally allows the
people of these states to bring forth or ratify amendments to their state constitutions directly, without having to resort to normal legislative channels. Id. at 59.
Dinan notes that eighteen states permitted citizen initiatives to amend their constitutions by the end of the twentieth century, with Oregon acting as the first
state to adopt this procedure in 1902. Id. at 62.
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ognizes the popular use of formal legal channels to create change.
Similarly, in Tennessee, local citizens retain law enforcement
power, as they possess the right to make citizen’s arrests.83 At first
glance, these examples seem to evidence a more complicated view
of who has the power to make and enforce law. On a fundamental
level, however, they still recognize the preeminent sovereignty of
the state because each example requires some form of state interaction, however minimal. Thus, while persons in Tennessee retain
the sovereign right to enforce law through a citizen’s arrest, they
must deliver their prisoner to a state magistrate or officer “without
unnecessary delay.”84
Ultimately, under a state sovereignty model, the people exercise rights by means other than mere popular will. For example,
legislative officials who perform their duties unfavorably are voted
out of office and replaced. In judicial matters, while the people
may disagree with a ruling of the Supreme Court, in the United
States, the consensus is that the Court holds the final word. Attempts to contest the decisions of the Court as promoting or opposing judicial nominees all implicitly admit the Court’s absolute supremacy. The people vote for their representatives, voice opinions
for or against court decisions, yet at all times behave within a set of
assumptions that true power has been delegated to governmental
entities and actors. The peoples’ remedies are voting, using the
courts, and peaceful protest.
IV. THE POLICE POWER AS AN ATTRIBUTE OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Having established that the state ultimately became the
practical sovereign, this Article next assesses the method by which
the state exercises its sovereign power, specifically the inherent
police power to control and guarantee the health, safety, and welfare of the community. Much of the relevant scholarship notes a
transformation of the police power in ways that largely track the
changes in sovereignty previously discussed. Markus Dirk Dubber
finds that the concept of police power formed when the governance
of the household was superimposed on the government of the state
itself—with the sovereign of the state acting as the theoretical head
83.
84.

See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-7-101, -109 (2012).
See id. § 40-7-113.
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of the state household.85 As the head of the state household, the
sovereign is thus charged with ensuring its wellbeing by using the
police power, which Dubber finds as the public equivalent of a
father’s use of discipline to ensure order in a private family setting.86
Other scholars like Harry Scheiber specifically traced the
origin of the term “police power” to Blackstone who classified
certain offenses as being against the “public police and []economy.”87 Blackstone likened the individuals who made up a polity to
members of a family who were “bound to conform their general
behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good
manners.”88 As a result of the “very miscellaneous” nature of this
category, the offenses covered a broad range of prohibitions, including most notably the power to abate common nuisances, as
opposed to private nuisances.89 Blackstone cited a long list of
what constitutes common nuisances, which included: “annoyances” in common highways like public rivers, roads, or bridges; “offensive trades” like ale houses, gambling dens, unlicensed theaters,
and inns that promoted disorderly conduct; unregulated lotteries;
fireworks; the presence of idlers, gypsies, and vagrants; and night
poaching, to name a few.90 Scheiber argues that both the common
law and civil law traditions long granted the sovereign these types
of broad powers to ensure the public good.91 In the case law of the
early American republic, Scheiber finds this power was also envi85. MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 81–82 (2005) [hereinafter THE
POLICE POWER]. In addition, Dubber has written a number of other works that
address the evolution of the this concept, including: MARCUS DIRK DUBBER,
VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF VICTIMS’ RIGHTS
(2002), and Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and
the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829 (2001).
86. THE POLICE POWER, supra note 85, at 58.
87. Harry N. Scheiber, Private Rights and Public Power: American Law,
Capitalism, and the Republican Polity in Nineteenth-Century America, 107
YALE L.J. 823, 824 n.6 (1997); see WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, BOOK THE FOURTH: OF PUBLIC WRONGS 162 (Dawsons
of Pall Mall, 1966).
88. BLACKSTONE, supra note 87, at 162.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 167–69.
91. Scheiber, supra note 87, at 833.
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sioned as an essential and indispensable attribute of sovereignty or,
alternatively, arose from a common-law-based theory emphasizing
the common welfare of the community.92
Christopher Tomlins argues that the idea of police as a term
largely synonymous with the common good pre-dated the early
republic and existed as far back as the early modern Europe.93
Like Scheiber, Tomlins dates an important milestone in the concept to Blackstone.94 Unlike Scheiber, however, Tomlins argues
that by the time of Blackstone’s Commentaries, the police power
was being reassessed from an insurer of community harmony and
order to a function of state power concerned more with security
than larger issues of public welfare.95 Similar to William Novak’s
well-regulated society, Tomlins argues that the Constitution succeeded in elevating law over popular politics as the primary discourse, “separat[ing] power from participation in pursuit of an earlier and more familiar pattern of elite rule in the American polity.”96 While the discourse of police and its focus on common good
or happiness had a brief period of expression, it became a power of
the state when it met the discourse of law.97 By the nineteenth century, the idea of police had become one “stripped of the language
of democratic participation that had been so essential a component
of the ideal of police-as-happiness current in the revolutionary
era.”98 Tomlins’s observations regarding the evolution of the police power are compelling. Like popular sovereignty, the police
power was redefined as a power belonging to the state, instead of a
tool retained by a community to ensure harmonious living. The
police power expanded to provide for a method of control and reg92.
93.

Id. at 824 n.6.
CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 45 (1993).
94. Id. at 78–79.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 90–91, 94; see WILLIAM NOVAK, THE PEOPLES’ WELFARE:
LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1996). Novak
argues that the idea that nineteenth century America was characterized by small
government, private enterprise, and absolute respect for private property is a
myth. NOVAK, supra note 96, at ix–x, 1. Rather, in what he refers to as the
“well-regulated society,” Novak states that the U.S. in this era readily deployed
governmental power to address economic and social concerns. Id. at 1.
97. TOMLINS, supra note 93, at 94.
98. Id.
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ulation by the state to punish offenders, abate nuisance, or regulate
a trade or a business, as opposed to a popular power that existed to
provide communal order.
When the police power was reconfigured to fit within the
state sovereignty model, it covered a whole host of abilities, with
law enforcement as a prime responsibility. Similarly, other scholars like Elizabeth Dale recognize the struggles regarding who had
the exclusive right to enforce the law.99 Dale notes that the issue
of who had the right to enforce the law, which we appreciate as
now residing exclusively with the state, was also the product of an
evolution.100 From the founding until the 1930s, Dale finds that
popular forces routinely claimed the right to enforce law.101 In
making this conclusion, Dale compartmentalizes this evolution into
six eras. From 1789 to 1839, Dale argues that in the absence of
formal police departments, criminal justice was decentralized and
was enforced mainly for the violation of local norms.102 From
1840 through the end of the Civil War, competing forces of municipal and state governments attempted to gain control of criminal
justice from popular action through the creation of police forces
and state prisons.103 Dale finds that in this era, both the state and
local communities exercised law enforcement powers simultaneously.104 From the close of the Civil War through 1900, Dale argues that while the state and occasionally the federal government
stepped up their efforts to bring extra-legal justice under control,
they could not stamp out the competing popular traditions that survived the end of the Civil War, Reconstruction, its collapse, and
the establishment of the Jim Crow order in the South in the late

99. See generally ELIZABETH DALE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES 1789–1939 (2011).
100. Id. at 2.
101. Id. at 2–5.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Id. Laura Edwards recognizes a similar dynamic in her study of rural
North and South Carolina beginning in the late 1820s and early 1830s as both
states codified criminal laws and built scores of new courthouses, pushing each
state’s authority farther into the Carolina backcountry. LAURA F. EDWARDS,
THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: LEGAL CULTURE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
INEQUALITY IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH 205–19 (2009).
104. DALE, supra note 99, at 3.
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1880s.105 Between the turn of the century and 1936, the reformation of police departments, the creation of numerous specialty
courts and the deployment of a campaign to curb public support for
extra-legal violence like lynching largely brought much of the extreme violence to a conclusion.106 Although lynching was nearly
eradicated, other types of extra-legal justice persisted—from unions that destroyed property during strikes while “law and order”
groups formed private armies to eliminate the threat, to mobs attacking Germans during WWI, to the violence of the Chicago Race
Riot that stemmed from white outrage over a perceived violation of
racial swimming norms.107 Alarmed by the national labor unrest
exemplified by events like the Memorial Day Massacre of 1937,
from 1937 to 1939 Congress and the Supreme Court actively implemented measures to place the right to enforce law or community
norms squarely with the state.108
105. Id. at 4; Michael Pfeiffer has also studied the prevalence of extralegal activities during this era, or what he refers to as “rough justice.” MICHAEL
PFEIFER, ROUGH JUSTICE: LYNCHING AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 1874–1947, at 3
(2004).
106. DALE, supra note 99, at 4.
107. Id. at 4, 105, 114–15.
108. Dale argues that the Supreme Court emphasized its view that extralegal justice would no longer be tolerated in the following opinions: NLRB v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 256–57, 261 (1939) (holding that
sit-down strikes were not protected by the Wagner Act); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 145–55 (1938) (expanding the Court’s rationale in Palko by upholding the Federal Filled Milk Act as proper under the
Commerce Clause, despite objections that the Act was actually a police power
measure reserved exclusively to the states and, more famously, that laws that
restricted the political process, targeted a minority group, or implicated a fundamental right would be subject to strict scrutiny); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 323–26 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969) (holding that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment was not
incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, but the
Court nonetheless ruled that those rights that were essential to “a scheme of
ordered liberty” would be applicable); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 30, 49 (1937) (declaring the Wagner Act constitutional); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 390–99 (1937) (upholding a state law that set
a minimum wage for women and rejected the Lochner-era assumption that employers and employees negotiated employment terms from equal bargaining
positions). For Dale, this evidenced the Court’s transition toward viewing rights
as universal and protected by the courts, as opposed to its past interpretations
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Thus, the state’s exclusive power to enforce law is the end
result of a 150-year contest over who could completely claim that
power. Traffic camera contracts compromise that legacy. Our
acceptance of the state as the institution with the exclusive duty of
law enforcement obscures the long conflict regarding who could
lay exclusive claim to this right. By parting with portions of its
essential police power in the name of cost-cutting and efficiency,
the state contracts away portions of its sovereignty that took generations to monopolize. Examples of this trend will be discussed in
the following section.
V. DELEGATION OF THE POLICE POWER COMPROMISES THE
NOTION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
This section will first examine the ways that traffic camera
contracts affect the actual sovereignty of the state. Traffic camera
contracts that delegate the state’s exclusive power to detect and
punish traffic law violations impede on state-based sovereignty in
two ways. The first concerns the sovereignty of the municipality
itself and makes for a fairly obvious point: if a municipality signs
a contract with a private entity, it is largely responsible under the
law of contract to fulfill its promise. After entering into these contracts, many municipalities find ending the relationship much more
difficult than expected. The municipality cannot simply unilaterally terminate the contract, as would be expected of contractually
obligated parties. The concern is that by subcontracting the power
to enforce traffic laws, part of its police power, the municipality
contracts away part of its sovereignty.
Certainly, these agreements dovetail neatly with a currently
ascendant neoliberal ideology that emphasizes the primacy of the
free market. Under this logic, everyone wins: the task of traffic
enforcement is done more efficiently (as the private sector always
ensures, according to the argument); it frees up law enforcement
for other more serious tasks; municipalities generate sorely needed
revenue for their budgets; and the citizenry is generally safer as the
traffic laws are quickly and more easily enforced. By stepping
back and analyzing this trend, however, it becomes apparent that
where rights were used to create hierarchies of citizens. DALE, supra note 99, at
4–5, 122–35.
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there are significant costs to this model. Thus, in this first instance, many municipalities bind themselves to contracts that they,
or their successors, may wish to rescind at a later date. Many find
that a change of heart on traffic cameras is not enough, as the contracting municipalities have not only contracted away their part of
their police power, but also their sovereign right to determine the
best method of enforcing the laws.109 For example, as seen in the
dispute between the city of Houston and ATS, shortly after a citizen petition forced the city’s hand to discontinue the traffic camera
program, ATS reminded the city of its contractual remedies to seek
$25 million in damages for early termination of their contract,
which extends through May 2014.110
The second situation in which these contracts impede on
state sovereignty occurs when the municipality seeks to continue
with the contract, but the existence of the agreement then ties the
hands of the state government—the entity from which the municipality largely draws its powers. Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. v.
Town of Farragut, Tennessee,111 discussed in Part I, provides a
good example of this scenario. In this case, Redflex executed a
traffic camera contract with the town of Farragut, Tennessee on
November 9, 2009.112 In addition to the Farragut contract, Redflex
109. While municipalities have long entered into contracts with private
entities to perform certain public functions, scholars like Christopher Serkin and
Julia Roin have noted that, in light of the economic downturn, many municipalities have improperly moved much more aggressively toward tying the hands of
their successors in order to cover present shortfalls. See Roin, supra note 36, at
2001; Serkin, supra note 30, at 943.
110. Chris Moran, Houston Red-Light Cameras: All Over But the Litigation, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 24, 2011, http://www.chron.com/news/houstontexas/article/Houston-red-light-cameras-All-over-but-the-2139922.php.
111. Redflex Complaint, supra note 5.
112. Redflex Complaint, supra note 5. While Redflex is a separate entity
formally incorporated under the laws of the state of Delaware and based in
Phoenix, Arizona, it is owned by Redflex Holdings Ltd., based in South Melbourne, Victoria, Australia. See Christopher Palmeri & Simone Baribeau, Drivers Stopping Means Red-Light Cameras Don’t Yield Cash Goals, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (July 5, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0706/drivers-stopping-means-miami-red-light-cameras-fail-to-yield-promisedcash.html; REDFLEX HOLDINGS: INVESTOR RELATIONS, http://www.redflex.com/
index.php/en/2012-02-24-01-10-24 (last visited Dec. 18, 2012); REDFLEX
TRAFFIC SYSTEMS NORTH AMERICA, http://www.redflex.com/index.php/en/
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signed contracts with eight other Tennessee municipalities to install traffic cameras across the state.113 Subsequently, Tennessee
placed significant restrictions on the use of traffic cameras within
the state.114 Although the subsequent law affected their interests
across the state, Redflex chose Farragut as the venue to set forth its
challenge. A wealthy community operating effectively as a western suburb of Knoxville, Farragut proudly touts it designation as
the “[m]ost Business Friendly City in Tennessee,” an award it has
won twice since the honor began in 2006.115
On November 14, 2011, Redflex sued the town of Farragut,
seeking a declaratory judgment that the state law did not apply to
their contract.116 Specifically, the Complaint asked the court to
declare that the law was only intended to apply prospectively,
which would leave the Redflex contract untouched.117 Alternatively, Redflex requested that the court hold the law itself unconstitutional as violating the Tennessee Constitutional prohibition on retrospective laws or laws which impair contracts.118 On December
14, 2011, Redflex filed an amended complaint to name the state of
Tennessee and the state attorney general, Robert Cooper, Jr. as
defendants.119 Thomas Hale, attorney for Farragut, emphasized the
2012-03-14-00-50-01 (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). American Traffic Solutions,
Inc. is incorporated as a Kansas corporation but also has its principal place of
business in nearby Scottsdale, Arizona. See Am. Traffic Solutions Complaint,
supra note 7.
113. Bill Brewer & Don Jacobs, Redflex Sues Farragut over New Traffic
Camera Law, KNOXVILLE SENTINEL (Nov. 17, 2011, 4:00 AM),
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/nov/17/redflex-sues-farragut-over-newtraffic-camera/; see Redflex Complaint, supra note 5.
114. Act of 2011, ch. 425, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 425, § 6 (codified at
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-8-101, -110, -198 (2012)).
115. Farragut Named State’s Most Business-Friendly City, KNOXVILLE
NEWS SENTINEL (Nov. 15, 2011, 8:42 PM), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/
2011/nov/15/farragut-named-states-most-business-friendly/;
TOWN
OF
FARRAGUT, TENN., http://www.townoffarragut.org/index.aspx?NID=35 (last
visited Dec. 18, 2012).
116. Redflex Complaint, supra note 5.
117. Id.
118. Id.; see also TENN. CONST. art. I, § 20.
119. Heather Mays Beck, Redflex Amends Suit to Include State, Moves to
Join
Knoxville
Suit,
FARRAGUT
PRESS
(Jan.
5,
2012),
http://www.farragutpress.com/articles/2012/01/14966.html.
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town’s commitment to the Redflex contract when he stated that he
encouraged Redflex to add the state as a party.120 Hale also made a
critical point when he commented on the constitutionality of the
state law that curbed the use of the traffic cameras, arguing that,
unlike a procedural law that could apply retroactively, substantive
laws are “‘not supposed to be applied retroactively because they
would adversely affect people’s contract rights or other rights they
may have.’”121 Here, Hale tacitly recognized the real tension in
this case—the sovereign power of the state legislature to prescribe
traffic laws versus the ability of municipalities to limit that power
by delegating law enforcement duties to private entities that can
claim competing contract rights.
Hale also noted that Redflex had also filed a motion to consolidate its case against Farragut with a similar case filed by competitor ATS against nearby Knoxville, Tennessee.122 On November 8, 2011, roughly one week before Redflex brought suit against
Farragut, its competitor ATS filed suit nominally against its customer the City of Knoxville, also seeking a declaratory judgment
exempting it from the state law.123 While ATS was similarly aggrieved by the Tennessee state law restricting the use of traffic
cameras, their suit against Knoxville relied on slightly different
reasoning than Redflex. For example, both complaints relied heavily on the common precept that laws usually only have prospective
applications.124 ATS, however, went further and argued that the
city of Knoxville, under its designation as a home-rule municipality, had “inherent authority and police power to act as sovereign to
make laws and ordinances necessary to secure the safety, health,
peace, comfort, and convenience of Knoxville without impermissible interference from the Tennessee General Assembly.”125 As the
basis for its argument, ATS relied on Article XI, Section 9 of the
Tennessee Constitution, which provides for the election of home
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.; Am. Traffic Solutions Complaint, supra note 7.
123. Am. Traffic Solutions Complaint, supra note 7.
124. Id.; Redflex Complaint, supra note 5.
125. Am. Traffic Solutions Complaint, supra note 7. Certainly, a good
reason why Redflex chose not to rely on a similar line of argument is that while
Knoxville is a home rule city, Farragut is not.
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rule;126 however, as it largely prohibits the state from passing special laws that affect home rule cities or removing home rule officers, a blanket statement that a home-rule city has exclusive police
power to the exclusion of the state legislature is an overly expansive constitutional interpretation.127 While ATS made an argument
that the city of Knoxville has police power that trumps that of the
state of Tennessee, state Attorney General Robert Cooper, Jr. fashioned largely the opposite argument.
In his August 8, 2011 Attorney General Opinion, Cooper
addressed the question of whether the state law curbing the use of
the cameras unconstitutionally violates the contracts entered into
by the Tennessee municipalities, as the state constitution prohibits
the impairment of contracts.128 Cooper held that it would not.129
In so doing, Cooper set forth a view of the state’s police power as
one that cannot be restrained by a private contract, as it is wellrecognized that all contracts are subject to modification in light of
the police power.130 In this case, because the police power in ques126.

The Tennessee Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
The General Assembly shall have no power to pass a special,
local or private act having the effect of removing the incumbent from any municipal or county office or abridging the
term or altering the salary prior to the end of the term for
which such public officer was selected, and any act of the
General Assembly private or local in form or effect applicable
to a particular county or municipality either in its governmental or its proprietary capacity shall be void and of no effect unless the act by its terms either requires the approval by a twothirds vote of the local legislative body of the municipality or
county, or requires approval in an election by a majority of
those voting in said election in the municipality or county affected.
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
127. See id.
128. Constitutionality of Restrictions on Use of Unmanned Traffic Enforcement Cameras, Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. 11-61 (2011) [hereinafter Constitutionality of Restrictions]; see TENN. CONST. art. I, § 20.
129. Constitutionality of Restrictions, supra note 128.
130. Id. Cooper also argues that the law in question does not violate the
state constitution as it was remedial in nature and not retrospective. Id. Further,
as noted previously, Christopher Serkin has aptly described the long standing
balance required of the government between honoring contractual obligations
and exercising its sovereign powers. See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying
text.
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tion comes in the form of a state law, the ATS v. Knoxville litigation sets up a showdown between the primacy of a municipality’s
police power versus the state’s police power. Thus, at its base,
these traffic camera contracts create a conflict between the contractual obligations of municipal governments and the power of state
legislatures to accede to the larger demands of the citizenry that the
practice be discontinued.
VI. DELEGATION OF THE POLICE POWER COMPROMISES OUR
APPRECIATION OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
While traffic camera contracts can contest the sovereignty
of the state by determining how public safety violations are monitored and punished, these agreements can also limit sovereignty in
more fundamental ways. Specifically, these contracts, signed by
municipalities as the representatives of the local electorate, can
also infringe on the conceptual sovereignty of the citizenry at
large. While the state is the entity that exercises sovereignty, the
ideology that the state operates at the pleasure and direction of the
citizenry is essential to the continued legitimacy of this arrangement. As noted by Patricia Ewick, ideology can operate as a process by which people make sense of their personal lives, as well as
structure their views of their larger society.131 One of the most
common functions of ideology is its role in providing legitimacy
for the many unequal relationships in society by depicting them as
historically innate or routine.132
One such relationship that ideology legitimizes is that between the state and the citizenry regarding the location of actual
sovereignty. The ideology that the people have the ultimate power
allows governance to continue in its current form. By parting with
the sovereign power to enforce and punish certain laws thought the
vehicle of contract, many municipalities are testing the conceptual
structure that supports this ideology by placing the sovereign power given them by the electorate off limits. These agreements essentially transform the sovereign responsibility of law enforcement
131. Patricia Ewick, Consciousness and Ideology, in THE BLACKWELL
COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 80, 80–81 (Austin Sarat, ed., 2004).
132. Id. at 86; see also JOHN B. THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN
CULTURE: CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY IN THE ERA OF MASS COMMUNICATION 6–
10 (1990).
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into questions of ordinary contract rights, which then become the
domain of courts and the rules of contract. Alienating these sovereign powers exposes popular sovereignty as an ideology, in its
negative connotation, as well.
For example, in the Bellingham, Washington traffic camera
case discussed in Part I, ATS brought suit against the city of Bellingham, the county, the county auditor and the four sponsors of a
citizen initiative, which sought to add a traffic camera prohibition
to the city code.133 ATS sought two avenues of relief: first, it
sought a declaratory judgment holding the initiative illegitimate
because it violated the powers of the city council granted under
state law; and second, it petitioned the court to enjoin the initiative
from appearing on the November ballot.134 Initially, the petition
sponsors fared well. On August 17, 2011, the trial court ruled
against ATS and directed it to pay the petition sponsors’ attorneys’
fees and costs, as well as a statutory fine of $10,000.00.135 ATS
sought an expedited appeal the same day and, on September 6,
2011, the day before the November ballots were to be printed, the
Washington Court of Appeals entered its ruling.136 The appeals
court overturned the trial court and held the initiative invalid because it infringed on the power of the municipality.137 The court
held that the Washington State Legislature specifically authorized
local municipalities to install traffic cameras through municipal
ordinances.138 Thus, the state legislature had specifically granted
authority to the officers of the municipalities, thereby preempting
acts by local residents.139
Seventy miles south of Bellingham, a similar scenario occurred in Mukilteo, Washington, an affluent northern suburb of
Seattle. In response to the same 2005 state law that allowed Bellingham the authority to sign private traffic camera contracts, the
Mukilteo city council passed an ordinance in May of 2010 that
133. Am. Traffic Solutions, Inc. v. City of Bellingham, 260 P.3d 245, 247
(Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 249.
138. Id. at 248 (noting that this authority was granted pursuant to section
46.63.170 of the Revised Code of Washington).
139. Id.
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granted the mayor authority to contract with ATS to place cameras
in the city.140 One month later, a citizen petition drive began that
sought to prohibit the installation of the cameras unless approved
by at least two-thirds of the electorate, to limit the amount of fines
for violations evidenced only by the cameras, to revoke the existing ordinance, and to prohibit future cameras ordinances without a
citizen vote.141 Shortly thereafter, the city council appeared to experience a change of heart and passed a resolution withdrawing its
consent to allow the mayor to sign the camera contract and ordering the petition initiative placed on the November ballot.142 In response, the “Mukilteo Citizens for Simple Government” brought
suit in state court against the city and a number of city officials,
asking the court to declare the petition initiative illegal and to enjoin its appearance on the ballot.143 The trial court ruled against
the Mukilteo Citizens’ challenge as premature, and the local electorate approved the initiative restricting the cameras in the subsequent November election.144 While its opponents accused the
Mukilteo Citizens for Simple Government of being nothing more
than a concocted front for the traffic camera lobby, the group prevailed on its appeal when the Washington Supreme Court held that
it did have standing to bring the challenge.145 In a 5-4 decision, the
court held that the citizen initiative was invalid as a violation of the
state law that governed the use of traffic camera contracts.146 The
court characterized the law as giving exclusive discretion over the
use of this technology to the municipalities, and this discretion was
not subject to citizen review.147
140. Mukilteo Citizens for Simple Gov’t v. City of Mukilteo, 272 P.3d
227, 229–30 (Wash. 2012).
141. Id. at 230.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 230–31; Oscar Halpert, Mukilteo Group Fighting Eyman Initiative Remains a Mystery, EVERETT HERALD, July 28, 2010,
http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20100728/NEWS01/707289800; Scott North
& Rikki King, Traffic Camera Company Sought Mukilteo Officials’ Help in
Filing Lawsuit, EVERETT HERALD, Aug. 7, 2011, http://heraldnet.com/article/
20110807/NEWS01/708079940.
146. Mukilteo Citizens, 272 P.3d at 233–34 (referencing WASH. REV.
CODE § 46.63.170 (2012)).
147. Id.
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Both courts in the Bellingham and Mukilteo cases relied
heavily upon a 2006 Washington Supreme Court case, City of Sequim v. Malkasian148 for their decision.149 Though the case concerned a citizen initiative to place additional restraints on the city’s
issuance of revenue bonds and was not a traffic camera case, the
decision is nonetheless instructional. In Malkasian, its namesake,
Paul Malkasian, sponsored a ballot initiative that sought to make it
more difficult for the Sequim City Council to issue revenue bonds,
primarily through the requirement that final approval of most revenue bonds be obtained through citizen referendum.150 Prior to the
placement of the initiative on the ballot, the city brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the initiative exceeded its bounds
because the power to issue bonds was specifically granted to the
city council as a political body by state law and not to the city itself.151 The case had a tortuous history in which the trial court
ruled against the city, only to have the case bounce back and forth
between the appeals court and the trial court; the initiative question
finally arrived in the Washington Supreme Court, which handed
down its decision in 2006—approximately ten years after the saga
began.152 After untying the “procedural tangle,” the court ruled in
favor of the city.153 The court relied on three major concepts for its
ruling. First, it premised its decision on a strict textual reading of
the state law that granted power to issue revenue bonds to the “legislative body” of a municipality.154 Second, it implicitly viewed
the law as a delegated police power to the city.155 As such, the
court gave wide latitude to the city to issue revenue bonds to provide for the general welfare or best interests of the community.156
Finally, the court commented on the nature of sovereignty. Firmly
placing sovereignty with the state, the court held, “[w]hen the legislature grants authority to the governing body of a city, that au148. 138 P.3d 943 (Wash. 2006).
149. See Mukilteo Citizens, 272 P.3d at 233; Am. Traffic Solutions, Inc. v.
City of Bellingham, 260 P.3d 245, 247–48 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
150. Malkasian, 138 P.3d at 946.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 946–47.
153. Id. at 945.
154. Id. at 949–50.
155. Id. at 950–51.
156. Id. at 949–50.

412

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 43

thority is not subject to repeal, amendment, or modification by the
people through the initiative or referendum process.”157
A similar dynamic occurred in Houston where the city also
contracted with ATS for the installation of red light cameras.158
There, in 2004, the city council passed an ordinance allowing for
the installation of the cameras.159 Two years later, the city hired
ATS to finally install seventy traffic cameras across Houston.160 In
addition to installing the cameras, ATS would issue the notices of
violation as well as collect all fines.161 After four years of the program, however, many in Houston resented the cameras, organizing
to amend the city charter to specifically disallow their use.162 In
November of 2010, 53% percent of voters agreed with the camera
ban amendment.163 In response, the city took three steps. First, it
amended the charter as directed by the election.164 Second, it notified ATS that it would cancel the traffic camera contract.165 Finally, the city filed suit in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment to advise the city of its obligations, as it was caught between
a citizen mandate and an executed contract.166 Shortly thereafter,
ATS filed a counterclaim against the city, arguing that the citizen
initiative and the resulting charter amendments were invalid and
unconstitutional.167
On June 17, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas resolved the city’s dilemma. In its order on a
motion for summary judgment, the court ruled that the city charter
amendment was invalid.168 In making its decision, the court set
157. Id. at 951.
158. City of Hous. v. Am. Traffic Solutions, Inc., No. H-10-4545, 2011
WL 2462670, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 2011).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.; Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, City of Hous. v. Am. Traffic Solutions, Inc., 2011 WL 2462670 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 2011) (No. H-1045452010), 2010 WL 4780022.
167. City of Hous. v. Am. Traffic Solutions, Inc., 668 F.3d 291, 293 (5th
Cir. 2012).
168. Am. Traffic Solutions, Inc., 2011 WL 2462670, at *3.
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forth its view of the role of the sovereign, relying heavily on the
terminology and procedures inherent to the municipal governance
of Houston. For example, the court recognized that there was a
dispute concerning what to label the citizen initiative: was it a
charter amendment (as thought by the citizen initiative planners),
or was it actually a referendum designed to overturn an unpopular
city ordinance (as argued by ATS)?169 For the court, this distinction was critical. If the initiative was considered a referendum to
repeal an ordinance, the city charter mandated that any petition to
overturn the ordinance be filed within thirty days of passage.170
Clearly, as the action to ban the traffic cameras was brought four
years after the ordinance, classifying the initiative as a referendum
would provide a procedural method to dispose of the case. The
court reasoned:
On December 21, 2004, the city adopted the ordinance to use red-light cameras. The citizens had 30
days—until January 20—to gather the signatures for
a referendum to repeal it. No one did.
Almost six years after its adoption, people started a
petition drive for a referendum to stop the city’s use
of red-light cameras. The petitioners did not call it a
referendum—a proposition to repeal an offending
ordinance. To evade the deadline on referendums,
they called it an amendment to the charter. Presented with this mis-labeling, the council supinely ignored—over the voices of some of its members—
their responsibility and put the proposition to the
voters as an amendment to the charter.
The court’s inquiry is limited to the character and
effect of the election as ascertained from an obdurate reality—not from labels and press releases.171
Here, the court used a procedural requirement—the thirty
day deadline to repeal ordinances—to invalidate the amendment,
169.
170.
171.

Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
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as it provided the only method by which the residents of Houston
could object to the delegation of powers they, in theory, delegated
to the state.172 In so doing, the court envisioned sovereignty as
firmly placed with the state. Under this view, the citizens can vote
for elected officials to make appropriate decisions, with the court
noting:
The deadline is short, but the people have an alternative, recurring way to repeal an offending ordinance. Since the referendum deadline passed, the
city has held three general elections for the mayor
and council. The same energy and organization that
went into the effort to repeal the ordinance may be
applied in future elections as an alternative to a referendum.173
Similar to the Bellingham and Mukilteo cases, the U.S. District Court in Houston envisioned an even more restrictive version
of state sovereignty, one where the only practical remedy is voting,
not petitioning the government (as the thirty day deadline makes
that virtually impossible) and not bringing suit (as the motion to
intervene was also denied).174
172. See id. at *3.
173. Id.
174. The ruling by the District Court is not the end of this matter, however.
The District Court also denied a motion to intervene in the case by parties involved with the original citizen’s initiative drive. On January 24, 2012, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court,
holding that the intervenors had standing as their interests were not properly
represented by their ostensible representatives, the city government. City of
Hous. v. Am. Traffic Solutions, Inc., 668 F.3d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 2012). The
Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Edith Jones, held that
[t]his is no matter of simply defending City policy of one sort
or another: it involves millions of dollars of revenue to City
coffers during a period of considerable economic uncertainty.
The district court erred in declaring that the Kuboshes [the
intervenors] had to prove a “meaningful probability [of inadequate representation] derived from actual facts.” Under the totality of circumstances here, including the haste of the litigation, the City’s pecuniary motives, the extended opposition to
the charter amendment, the agreed order to leave the cameras
in place, and the attempt to reinstate them before the suit had
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VII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing are but a few examples of municipalities
seeking to trim expenses by privatizing governmental services.
While many such services may make financial sense, they do not
take into account other more significant hidden costs. Others have
noted the societal and moral consequences behind privatizing governmental services that do not necessarily implicate core functions
like law enforcement. As noted in the Introduction, for example,
the state of Florida recently attempted to privatize the vast majority
of its prisons in south Florida.175 While this move ultimately
failed, the state legislature successfully privatized the health care
services provided to Florida’s inmate population.176 Although this
is being challenged by health care workers affected by the new
mandate, the end result of this transition for these health care
workers could likely be the standard story: they will perform the
same job, only now they will work for a private company for less
money, inferior benefits, and minimal job security.
This Article does not seek to repeat the critiques of this
now familiar story. Rather, this Article seeks to show that these
privatization efforts, at some point, challenge not only the actual
sovereignty of the state, but undermine the conceptual sovereignty
of the people as well. A unifying thread among these cases is that
traffic camera contracts can not only bind the state legislatures and
future officials elected to city government, but also constrain the
will of the electorate. For example, the Tennessee litigation shows
that a city council decision in a western suburb of Knoxville was
given standing to challenge the sovereignty of the state of Tennesconcluded (although this act occurred after the denial of the
intervention motion), it is sufficient to conclude that the
intervenors’ interests “may be” inadequately represented.
Id.
175. See Bousquet , supra note 26.
176. Steve Bousquet, Unions Sue over Plan To Privatize Prison Health
Care System, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012, http://www.tampabay.com/
news/health/unions-sue-over-plan-to-privatize-prison-health-care-system/
1215638. The privatization of health care services was successful in part due to
its inclusion in a proviso to the state budget, and it did not go through the normal
legislative process on its own, which the Tampa Bay Times reports is one of the
main legal arguments underlying the suit. Id.
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see itself. While the Redflex and ATS challenges to the Tennessee
state law were struck down by the trial court, this is very likely not
the final chapter for this specific litigation in Knox County, nor the
rest of the country.177 ATS has maintained a view that a contract is
a proper vehicle through which a municipality can both part with
its power of law enforcement and restrain the actions of a state
legislature seeking to respond to the demands of their constituents.
In commenting on the court’s decision, a representative for ATS
insisted on framing the dispute as one that “‘has implications for
all businesses, large or small, operating in the state. Ultimately,
what’s really at stake is whether or not a contract in Tennessee is
worth [the] paper it’s written on.’”178 This view myopically considers that a public municipality is indistinguishable from a private
business and fails to recognize that some governmental functions
simply cannot be delegated through contract without infringing on
sovereignty.
Further, as evidenced by the Houston litigation, municipalities that willingly part with their police power can even affect citizens’ right to influence their representatives. By delegating their
responsibilities to perform law enforcement to private entities
through legally enforceable contracts, they alienate one of their
fundamental rights of sovereignty, that of the police power. Once
the police power is made part of a private bargain, that power
transforms from a broad sword wielded by the state into just another limited subject of a contract.
This leads to a final question. If the power of sovereignty
rests with the state, subject to oversight by the citizenry, what happens to sovereignty when the state parts with portions of its sovereign power? In the traffic camera situation, the sovereign power of
law enforcement does not return to its conceptual owner. Instead,
it is contracted to third party corporations that are themselves comprised of select individuals serving as employees, officers, directors, and, if applicable, shareholders of these entities. Does this
177. Memorandum
Opinion
and
Order,
available
at
http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2012/tn-rightturn.pdf.
178. Don Jacobs, Knox Chancellor Nixes Attempt to Overturn Red Light
Camera Law, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL (June 8, 2012, 4:00 AM),
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012/jun/08/knox-chancellor-nixes-attempt-tooverturn-red/.
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trend signal the emergence of a new type of sovereignty other than
popular sovereignty or state sovereignty?

